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Many fraud detection problems involve large numbers of financial transactions such as
those associated with credit cards, accounts receivables, payments to vendors, payrolls, or other
expense accounts (Panigrahi 2006; Bolton and Hand 2002). Computer Assisted Auditing Tools
and Techniques (CAATTs) e.g., ACL (2006) allow auditors to perform digital analysis based on
Benford’s Law (Benford 1938) for scrutinizing high volumes of complex financial data and
detecting unintentional errors or fraud (AICPA 2008; Panigrahi 2006; Coderre 1999). However,
the advantages that these software packages offer for assessing data conformity to Benford’s
Law are limited due to problems associated with the underlying traditional statistical procedures.
Specifically, previous studies (e.g., Cho and Gaines 2007; Geyer and Williamson 2004;
Nigrini 2000) have issued caveats on the use of traditional statistical tests such as chi-square
goodness-of-fit or Z-tests in the context of Benford’s Law because applications of these tests to
large data sets may falsely lead auditors to believe that evidence of fraud exists when in fact
there is none. Nigrini (2000) defines this situation as the problem of “excessive power” (p.75).
Similarly, Geyer and Williamson (2004) note that “…one has to be careful in such
situations…where the sample size may be very large, for this [ Z ] test is almost certain to reject
the null hypothesis for a given significance level” (p. 234). Further, Cho and Gaines (2007) also
indicate that “…chi-square goodness-of-fit tests are very sensitive to sample size, having
*
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enormous power for large N, so that even quite small differences will be statistically significant”
(p. 220).
In view of the above, we introduce a bootstrap procedure to assess data conformity to
Benford’s Law that addresses the problem of excessive power (false alarms). The proposed
procedure is based on developing bootstrap confidence intervals for the mean, variance, skew,
and kurtosis associated with the first two digits of Benford data (e.g. non-fraudulent data) and
actual data that are subject to investigation. In addition, bootstrap confidence intervals for the
Pearson correlation between the first digits and the second digits can also be used as a supportive
(or decisive) analysis. Unlike the conventional analysis based on Benford’s Law that examines
financial data on a digit-by-digit basis, the proposed procedure allows auditors to diagnose
financial transactions on an overall basis. Thus, this procedure takes an approach that is similar
to what Cleary and Thibodeau (2005) suggested “Perhaps the most prudent approach would be to
begin the analysis stage with an overall analysis…” (p. 80).
Applications of the proposed procedure to reported annual earnings of S&P 1500
companies, Federal Election Commission data, and extremely fraudulent data demonstrate the
robustness of our procedure over different periods of time and across small or large financial
data sets. For example, the proposed bootstrap procedure and the traditional statistical tests were
applied to data sets that closely follow Benford’s Law such as reported annual earnings from
S&P 1500 companies. The results associated with the bootstrap procedure consistently
confirmed that the S&P 1500 companies are not likely to be engaged in earnings rounding-up
behaviors. In contradistinction, the results corresponding with the traditional statistical tests were
inconsistent across various sample sizes and time periods. Further, the proposed procedure was
applied to allegedly fraudulent data from the Federal Election Commission (Cho and Gaines
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2007) and extremely fraudulent data (Geyer and Williamson 2004; Hill 1998). The overall
results indicate that our procedure accurately detects fraud.
In the next section we provide the essential requisite information associated with the
bootstrap in the context of digital analysis and Benford’s Law. In Section III, we present
applications of the bootstrap procedure to reported annual earnings of S&P 1500 companies, the
allegedly fraudulent data from the FEC, and extremely fraudulent data. In Section IV, we discuss
the applications of the procedure and make comments and suggestions for users of the
methodology.
II. METHODOLOGY: THE BOOTSTRAP AND BENFORD’S LAW
The Bootrap
The bootstrap is a statistical procedure that has the advantage of being able to make
inferences about a fixed parameter, such as a population mean, without having to make
assumptions about the shape of the sampling distribution associated with the parameter’s
estimate. In the context of a population mean ( ), its sampling distribution can be thought of as
the distribution of sample means ( ) from all possible samples of a given sample size. In
contrast, traditional statistical tests such as Z or t-tests assume that the shape of the sampling
distribution for the mean has a normal distribution (i.e., a bell-shaped curve).
The bootstrap method consists of randomly sampling N observations from a data set of
size N. The random sampling is conducted with replacement and where each observation is
selected with equal probability. For each bootstrap sample, a sample statistic (e.g.
computed. This process is repeated T times to obtain T sample statistics

where

) is

1, … , .

The sample estimates are subsequently ordered from minimum to maximum i.e., min
,…,max

and are used to construct a 1
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100% bootstrap confidence interval

⁄

,

⁄

where

is the false alarm or Type I error rate (Efron and Tibshirani

1998).
For example, suppose we have a data set that consists of

5,000 payroll transactions.

Our first bootstrap sample is generated by sampling with replacement from the data 5,000
transactions and then the mean ( ) is computed for this sample. We repeat this procedure until
we have generated
,

25,000 bootstrap samples and, thus, have computed 25,000 sample means

based on the original 5,000 payroll transactions. The sample means

,

are

subsequently sorted from minimum to maximum. If one is willing to tolerate false alarms 1% of
the time (i.e., a Type I error rate of 0.01), then one would select the 125th and 24,875th values
from the ordered sample means of payroll transactions to be the lower and upper limits of the
bootstrap confidence interval (C.I.),

,

. In short, a 99% bootstrap C.I. has been

constructed for the sample mean of the payroll transactions. See Figure 1 for an illustration of
this process.
Given this introduction to the bootstrap, we subsequently discuss how bootstrapping can
be used in the context of Benford’s Law and for determining whether or not data are fraudulent
or contain unintentional errors. For additional details on the bootstrap see Hogg and Tanis
(2001), Efron and Tibshirani (1998), and Mooney and Duval (1993).
Benford’s Law
Benford (1938) observed numerous cases where the probabilities associated with the first
nine digits follow a logarithmic distribution. For example, digit 1 occurs more often than digit 2,
in turn, digit 2 occurs more often than digit 3, and successively up to digit 8 which occurs more
often than digit 9. See Table A.1 in Appendix A for the empirical probabilities associated with
the Benford (1938) digits. Benford (1938) formalized his observations in formulae to determine
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the exact probabilities (P) for the first digits (
probabilities for the first two digits (
∑

log

1

1⁄

where

), the second digits (
log

) as:
0,…9; and

1

1
log

), and the joint
where

1

1

1,…9;
where

10,…,99. Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 give the exact (Benford) probabilities associated with
the first, second, and first two digits, respectively. It is noted that although Benford (1938) did
not use financial data, research in accounting and auditing has demonstrated that the probabilities
of the leading (first, second, or first two) digits of these types of data can also follow Benford’s
Law (e.g., Caneghem 2004; Durschi et al. 2004; Kinnunnen and Koskela 2003; Nigrini 1996).
More specifically, and for the purposes considered in this study, if the leading digits associated
with a set of data follow Benford’s Law then these digits will have the exact probabilities listed
in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3. And, that these data are presumed not to contain fraudulent
transactions or unintentional errors.
As such, if data are assumed to follow Benford’s Law, then the probabilities listed in
Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 can be used to determine the population parameters of the mean ( ),
variance (

), skew ( ), and kurtosis ( ) for the distributions of the first digits, the second digits,

and the first two digits from the data set1. More specifically, if we assume that data follow
Benford’s Law then the following four null hypotheses (
for the first two digits (
and

:

) as

:

38.5898,

) can be formulated using Table A.3
:

621.8317,

:

0.771864,

0.546544 (See Appendix B for more specific details on computing these

parameters). That is, the first two digits (

) of a Benford data set must have these parameters

for the mean, variance, skew, and kurtosis. These parameters are referred to as “fraud-free”
because they are derived under the assumption that data follow Benford’s Law. Similarly, using
1

Suppose we have the following payroll transactions: $5846, $2508, $8046, and $1174. The first digits related to
these transactions are 5, 2, 8, and 1. The second digits are 8, 5, 0, and 1. The first two digits are 58, 25, 80, and 11.
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Tables A.1 and A.2, null hypotheses could also be separately formulated for the first digits
with fraud-free parameters of

3.440237,

0.548225; and for the second digits
8.25381,

0.133114, and

6.056513,

0.795604, and

with fraud-free parameters of

4.18730,

1.208390.

Given the specified fraud-free parameters above, the proposed bootstrapping procedure
has essentially three basic steps: (1) obtain the leading first two digits from the actual data set
under investigation and the exact (or Benford) first two digits which are generated by the user,
(2) construct bootstrap C.I.s for the mean, variance, skew, and kurtosis based on the actual and
exact digits, and (3) use the decision criteria provided in Figure 2 to infer whether the actual data
conform to Benford’ Law (see Figure 2).
Specifically, and in terms of step (1), the exact digits are generated based on the specific
N size of the actual data and the exact probabilities for the first, second, and first two digits listed
in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3. Algorithms and instructions for generating exact digits that have the
probabilities

listed

in

these

tables

are

available

at

the

following

website:

http://www.siuc.edu/~epse1/headrick/Benford/ExactDigits.doc.
In terms of step (2), the bootstrap C.I.s for the exact and actual digits can be easily
constructed using Spotfire S+ (2008) since there are no programming skills required. The
notations in S+, under the command resample bootstrap, for the sample statistics are: mean(X),
var(X), skewness(X), and kurtosis(X). We recommend that 99% C.I.s be generated for both the
exact digits and actual digits using

25,000 bootstrap samples with the Bias-Corrected

accelerated (BCa) default option. The 99% C.I. is based on a Boneferroni adjustment to the
usual false alarm rate (or Type I error rate) of 0.05. Thus, because there are four hypotheses, we
have a false alarm rate of 0.05⁄4

0.0125 and then rounding to the more commonly used error
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rate of 0.01. We recommend this conservative level of tolerance for false alarms to prevent
auditors from making false conclusions when testing all four hypotheses. We note that additional
step-by-step instructions are also provided for constructing bootstrap C.I.s using S+ at the
website indicated above.
The 99% C.I.s generated in step (2) for the exact digits and actual digits are then used in
conjunction with the decision criteria in Figure 2 to assess whether the actual data contain any
anomalies such as fraud or unintentional errors. As indicated in Figure 2, if the sample size of the
actual data is

1,000 then the first two digits (

) are considered first. Specifically, if all

four 99% C.I.s based on the actual digits either (a) contain their corresponding population
parameter (

38.5898,

621.8317,

0.771864,

0.546544) or (b) overlap

with their corresponding exact digit C.I., then we would fail to reject (or retain) the four null
hypotheses that are associated with the first two digits (

). For example, consider the

population mean for the first two digits. Suppose that we have a 99% C.I. for the exact digits of
[38.122

39.013] and a 99% C.I. for the actual digits of [38.557

Inspection of these C.I.s indicate that the latter C.I. contains the population mean
Alternatively, assume that the actual digit C.I. is [37.555

39.591].
.

38.529*]. This C.I. does

not contain the population mean, but overlaps with the exact (Benford) digit C.I. [38.122*
39.013] because the lower limit of the exact digit C.I. (38.122

is less than the upper

limit of the actual digit C.I. 38.529 . Thus, to reiterate, if the C.I.s for the mean, variance, skew,
and kurtosis either contain their associated parameter or overlap with their corresponding exact
digit C.I. then the conclusion would be made that the actual data (e.g., payroll transactions)
conform to Benford’s Law and, thus, do not have any anomalies (i.e., fraud or unintentional
errors). Conversely, if we were to reject all four null hypotheses because the actual digit C.I.s
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neither contain the parameters nor overlap with the exact digit C.I.s, then we would conclude that
the actual data are likely to contain unintentional errors or fraud and that additional investigation
is necessary.
For smaller sample sizes of data (
associated with the first two digits (

1,000) or for cases where the four hypotheses

) are inconsistent i.e. the four hypotheses were not all

rejected (retained), separate single digit analyses are appropriate. That is, check whether the first
digits and the second digits bootstrap C.I.s contain their corresponding population parameter or
overlap with their respective Benford C.I.s. If either of these criteria is met, then infer that the
actual data do not contain unintentional errors or fraud. Otherwise, use the bootstrap C.I. for the
Pearson correlation between the first digits (
the population correlation

) and the second digits (

). In a situation where

falls within the bootstrap C.I., then conclude that the actual

data (e.g., payroll transactions) do not contain fraudulent transactions. Otherwise, further
investigation is necessary. Applications of single digit analysis and Pearson correlation bootstrap
C.I.s are discussed in more detail using actual data sets in the next section.
III. APPLICATIONS
Data
The proposed bootstrap procedure was applied to three different kinds of data sets. The
first data set is the reported annual earnings of S&P 1500 companies (1990-2008) from
Compustat. Specifically, we used positive net income and income before extraordinary items
(IBEIs) to assess whether the U.S. publicly trading companies engage in cosmetic earnings
management. Our approach consisted of examining leading (first, second or first two) digits on
an overall basis rather than on a digit-by-digit basis.
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Kinnunnen and Koskela (2003) defined a cosmetic earnings management when upward
(downward) rounding of positive (negative) earnings cause leading digit (first or second digit)
frequencies to deviate significantly from their expected probabilities according to Benford’s
Law. For example, Carslaw (1988) found that the frequencies of second digit zeros and nines
associated with positive reported earnings of New Zealand companies significantly differ from
their expected probabilities. Further, Thomas (1989) indicated that U.S. companies also engaged
in cosmetic earnings managements by reporting more second digit zeros and less second digit
nines for positive earnings. However, the pattern of the actual probabilities for second digits
zeros and nines is reversed for negative earnings.
Subsequent studies provide evidence of European and Japanese listed companies also
exhibited cosmetic earnings management behaviors (Kinnunen and Koskela 2003, Caneghem
2004, Skousen et al. 2004, Caneghem 2002, Niskanen and Keloharju 2000). Nevertheless, study
results suggest that external auditors (Guan et al. 2006) or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [SOX] (Aono
and Guan 2008) likely deter companies from rounding up second digits of earnings towards the
nearest reference points. All of the above studies examined reported earnings on a digit-by-digit
basis. However, Cleary and Thibodeau (2005) indicated that conducting nine (or ten) separate
tests to examine first (second) digits likely increases false alarms (or Type I error). For example,
a digit-by-digit analysis of the first nine digits likely increases false alarms seven times more
often than an overall basis analysis of first nine digits for a Type I error rate of 0.05 (Cleary and
Thibodeau 2005, 80). In view of this problem, it is important to examine reported annual
earnings on an overall basis. The bootstrap procedure can be used to address this issue.
In addition, Aono and Guan (2008) used a conservative approach, i.e., a two-year
window period before and after SOX, to control the problem of excessive power. The authors
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commented that “…larger sample size due to the longer pre-SOX windows would increase the Zstatistic used to measure the significance of changes in the observed proportion of digits between
the two [pre- and post-SOX] period[s]…” (p. 218). We consider the use of the proposed
procedure to be appropriate in the context of larger sample sizes. As a result, we selected S&P
1500 reported earnings for pre- (1990-2002) and post-SOX (2003-2008) periods to examine the
effects of SOX on U.S. listed companies rounding-up behaviors.
The second data set relates to the Federal Election Commission (FEC) committee-tocommittee in-kind contributions. The FEC in-kind contributions represent a cash value for
services donated or bills paid by a third party on behalf of a campaign committee. Unlike regular
funds raised for candidates that must meet the maximum level requirements (e.g., individual
contributions up to $2,000 per federal candidates), in-kind contributions (i.e., soft money for
party committees) are exceptions for this limitation. As a result, the data qualifies for digital
analysis based on Benford’s Law.
The third data set concerns known fraudulent data (i.e., cash disbursements and payroll
information) taken from a 1995 King’s County, New York, District Attorney’s Office study
(Geyer and Williamson 2004, Hill 1998). We replicated first digits of the fraudulent data based
on the first digit probabilities listed in Table A. 1 provided by Hill (1998, 363).
Results
Tables 1 through 3 give the 99% bootstrap confidence intervals (C.I.s) associated with
the first two digits of Benford data and reported earnings. The S&P 1500 reported earnings relate
to the pre- (1990-2002) and post-SOX (2003-2008) periods as well as the combined period
(1990-2008). Inspection of these tables indicates that evidence of cosmetic earnings management
is unlikely. In fact, we find no evidence of U.S. listed companies to engage in rounding-up
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behaviors because the bootstrap C.I.s for the first two digits of net income (or income before
extraordinary items) either contain population parameters or overlap with the Benford C.I.s in
each period (see Tables 1, 2, and 3).
For example, the results in Table 1 show that the lower and upper limits of the 99%
bootstrap C.I.s associated with the mean of the first two digits of net income (1990–2002) are
37.743 and 38.658, respectively, and contain the population mean

38.58976 —i.e., the

fraud free parameter. To indicate this result visually, the lower and upper limits are bold and
double asterisks (**) are included at the end of the upper limit of the actual digits C.I. in each of
the Tables. On the other hand, the population parameter for the kurtosis

0.54654 does not

fall within the 99% bootstrap C.I. associated with the first two digits of net income (1990–2002).
However, its lower limit (-0.544) overlaps with the upper limit of exact (or Benford) C.I. In this
case, the lower limit of the bootstrap C.I. for the actual digits (e.g., net income) and the upper
limit of the Benford C.I. are bold and one asterisk (*) at the end of each lower or upper limits is
included.
Likewise, the results in Table 1 related to income before extraordinary items (IBEIs)
during the pre-SOX period (1990-2002) indicate that the population mean does not fall within
the actual digits’ C.I. Nevertheless, its upper limit (38.419) overlaps with the lower limit of the
Benford C.I. The other bootstrap C.I.s associated with the variance, skew, and kurtosis also
display overlapping C.I.s. In addition, we find either overlapping C.I.s or the population
parameter falling within the actual digit C.I.s in Tables 2 and 3.
The overall results in Tables 1 through 3 indicate that separate digit analyses are not
required. This is because all four first two digits bootstrap C.I.s for reported earnings either
contain their corresponding population parameter or overlap with the Benford C.I.s. To
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demonstrate this point, for example, the results in Tables 4 and 5 show that all four first (or
second) digits 99% bootstrap C.I.s for IBEIs either contain their corresponding population
parameter or overlap with their respective Benford C.I.s (see Tables 4 and 5).
However, inspection of Table 6 indicates that the results associated with the Nigrini
(1996) distortion factor indices (Z-tests) and chi-square goodness-of-fit tests differ from those
reported under the bootstrap procedure and suggest evidence of cosmetic earnings management
during the pre- and post-SOX periods. These differences indicate that traditional statistical
procedures (e.g., Z-tests or chi-square goodness-of-fit tests) may exhibit the problem of
excessive power. That is, the results of traditional statistical procedures may provide evidence of
cosmetic earnings management as the number of transactions gets larger when, in fact, there is
none. To demonstrate this problem, we used the Euclidean distance
bootstrap C.I.s for the Pearson correlation

on the first digits and

between the first digits and second digits.

The application of the Euclidean distance (ED) in the context of Benford’ Law consists of
finding an index of distance between the actual first digit probabilities ( ) and the first digit
exact (Benford) probabilities ( ), where i=1,…9. Given these probabilities, the Euclidean
distance in the context of Benford’s Law is computed as

∑

. Intuitively, the

larger the distance, the worse the fit of a data set to Benford’s Law (i.e., a data set with potential
fraud). Despite its simple application in the context of Benford’s Law, the Euclidean distance is
not an inferential statistic. Thus, it cannot be used to summarize the main characteristic of the
actual digits (e.g., amount of variations in payroll transactions) and infer whether the actual data
contain unintentional errors or fraudulent transactions for a given level of confidence.
As such, the approach taken here will be that of Cho and Gaines (2007) who compared
the Euclidean distance for each one of the FEC data sets (1998-2006) to the cut-off value of
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0.024. This value of
(1938) probabilities
measure of

is computed by using the exact

and empirical Benford

listed in Table A.1. Cho and Gaines (2007) submitted that this distance

represents “a rough sense for what constitutes a realistic, small value [associated

with empirical Benford data]” (p.221). Euclidean distances less than

and closer to zero

imply that data more closely conform to Benford’s Law than the Euclidean distance greater than
and nearer to one. Thus, the lower and upper limits of the Euclidean distance are zero and
one, respectively (i.e.,

0,1 ), where a value of

0 implies an exact correspondence to

the first digit probabilities of Benford’s Law. The Euclidean distances reported in Table 6 are
much smaller than

0.024, suggesting that the reported earnings data more closely follow

Benford’s exact probabilities than Benford’s (1938) empirical probabilities (see Table 6).
In addition, the Pearson correlation coefficient indicates the strength and direction of the
linear relationship between the first digits and second digits. In the context of hypothesis testing,
we state that data free of fraud or unintentional errors will have a population correlation
coefficient between the first digits (

) and the second digits (

the null hypothesis associated with the fraud-free parameter is

) of
:

0.0561. That is,
0.0561. See at the

end of Appendix B for derivation of the population correlation. The results in Table 7 indicate
that, for pre- and post-SOX periods, each of the bootstrap C.I.s for the Pearson correlation
and, thus, lends to the bootstrap analyses

coefficient contains the population correlation

that the annual reported earnings (net income and IBEIs) conform to Benford’s Law. Note that
the bootstrap correlation C.I.s were based on 25,000 random samples for a given 99% confidence
level that is consistent with the construction of leading digits bootstrap C.I.s (see Table 7).
In summary, both the Euclidean distances and the Pearson correlation bootstrap C.I.s
provide evidence that the bootstrap procedure does not exhibit the problem of excessive power.
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Therefore, these two indices suggest that the Nigrini (1996) distortion factor index (Z-test) and
the chi-square goodness-of-fit test have this problem.
In addition to the S&P 1500 reported earnings, we applied the proposed procedure to the
Federal Election Commission (FEC) committee to committee in-kind contributions for years
1998, 2000, and 2002. The results in Table 8 indicate that the 1998 FEC data contain allegedly
fraudulent transactions. Specifically, all of the four C.I.s associated with the first two digits of
the 1998 FEC data do not contain the corresponding population parameter and, thus, suggest that
single digit analyses are not necessary. In fact, the results in Tables 9 and 10 provide support for
this conclusion (see Tables 8, 9, and 10).
On the other hand, the results in Table 11 show that only one C.I. associated with the first
two digits of the 2002 FEC data contain the population parameter (i.e., mean). As a result, single
digit analyses are required. The results in Tables 12 and 13 indicate that the decision criteria for
separate single digit analyses described in Figure 2 are not met. In other words, all C.I.s
associated with the first digits and the second digits of the 2002 FEC data neither contain the
corresponding population parameter nor overlap with the exact (Benford) digit C.I.s. Therefore,
we conducted the Pearson correlation analysis and concluded that the 2002 FEC data are
fraudulent. That is, the 99% bootstrap C.I. for the Pearson correlation between the first digits
and the second digits of the 2002 FEC data do not contain the population correlation

.

See Table 7 for further details (see Tables 11, 12, and 13).
The bootstrap C.I.s for the Pearson correlation can be used as a decisive factor when the
results of the bootstrap procedure do not meet the decision criteria for the digit analyses
described in Figure 2. In particular, the results associated with the 2000 FEC data in Tables 14,
15, and 16 indicate that only two out of four C.I.s for the first two digits contain the population
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parameters. The follow-up separate analyses also show that only two out of four C.I.s for the first
digits and one out of four C.I.s for the second digits either contain the corresponding population
parameter or overlap with the Benford C.I.s. Up to this point, the evidence is not clear enough to
infer whether any potential anomalies (i.e., suspicious transactions from committees to
committees) exist in the 2000 FEC data (see Tables 14, 15, and 16).
However, the results in Table 7 show that the Pearson correlation between the first digits
and the second digits of the 2000 FEC data is 0.144 which differs significantly from the
population correlation

0.0561 . Altogether the first two digits or single digit analyses

for the 1998, 2000, and 2002 FEC data present evidence that support the observations made by
Cho and Gaines (2007). That is, allocations of “soft” money from committee to committee in
each one of these election cycles (i.e., 1998, 2000, and 2002) were likely manipulated.
Finally, the proposed methodology was applied to simulated first digits of extremely
fraudulent data based on the probabilities provided by Hill (1998). We note that Hill’s (1998)
study is limited to first digits analysis. Despite this limitation, we generated two different sample
sizes of data (N=20,229 and N=500) to demonstrate that our proposed procedure accurately
detects fraudulent transactions regardless of sample size. The results listed in Table 17 indicate
that the bootstrap procedure consistently rejects the four null hypotheses for both large
N 20,229 and small N 500 sample sizes and provides the same conclusions as those made by
Hill (1998) (see Table 17).
IV. DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS
The bootstrap procedure provides accurate and consistent results over different time
periods and across different volumes of transactions as opposed to the Nigrini (1996) distortion
factor index (Z-test) or chi-square goodness-of-fit tests. These results show that the bootstrap
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procedure ameliorates the problem of excessive power described by Nigrini (2000). In addition,
our procedure has advantages compared to other approaches such as the mean absolute deviation
(MAD), the Euclidean distance, or Bayesian methods that do not exhibit the problem of
excessive power. Specifically, the mean absolute deviation and the Euclidean distance do not
allow practicing auditors to make probabilistic statements of whether data conform to Benford’s
Law (Cho and Gaines 2007; Nigrini 2000). Geyer and Williamson (2004) restricted their
Bayesian method to first digit analysis. This restriction may prevent auditors from detecting
fabricated data where inspection of second, third, or later digits increases the likelihood of
discovering suspicious fraudulent entries; and when, in some instances, first digit probability
distribution of fabricated data does result in a Benford-like pattern (Diekmann 2007; 328).
It is also noteworthy to point out that the bootstrap procedure allows auditors to examine
financial data sets on an overall basis. This approach differs from the statistical procedure used
by Aono and Guan (2008) et al. who conducted multiple Z-tests on a digit-by-digit basis. To
assess data conformity to Benford’s Law, we recommend that an overall analysis be used rather
than a digit-by-digit analysis because the latter approach inflates false alarms (Type I error) as
the number of digits to be examined increases (Cleary and Thibodeau 2005). Further, we suggest
that bootstrap confidence intervals (C.I.s) of the Pearson correlation between the first digits and
the second digits be used as a decisive factor in situations where the evidence does not clearly
indicate whether data follow Benford’s Law. Furthermore, we note that the minimum sample
size required to conduct the first and second digit analysis is N 1,000 observations. For samples
sizes of less than 1000, it is recommended that only separate single digit analyses be performed.
The primary reason is that the proposed bootstrap procedure does not provide stable upper or
lower limits for the first two digits exact (Benford) C.I.s for sample sizes less than 1000.
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As a final point, we would recommend that practicing auditors be aware of certain
conditions where applications of the proposed procedure to large data sets (e.g., transaction-level
or large data sets) may not be appropriate. Some of these situations involve assigned numbers,
numbers influenced by human thoughts, accounts set up to record firm specific numbers, or
numbers with maximum or minimum thresholds that comprise financial data subject to
investigations. Also our procedure may not be useful to detect fraud in the case where financial
data do not have records of suspicious transactions such as “thefts, kickbacks, bribes or contract
rigging” (Durtschi, Hillison and Pacini 2004, p. 24).
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APPENDIX A
Table A.1. Exact, Benford (1938), and Fraudulent data empirical first digit probabilities.
First Digits (
Exact Benford
Empirical Benford
Fraudulent Data

1
0.301
0.289
0.000

2
0.176
0.195
0.019

3
0.125
0.127
0.000

4
0.097
0.091
0.097

5
0.079
0.075
0.612
1 1

6
0.067
0.064
0.233

7
0.058
0.054
0.010

8
0.051
0.055
0.029

9
0.046
0.051
0.000

Exact = theoretical probabilities are computed as
where
1,…9.
Benford = empirical first digit probabilities estimated by Benford (1938) who used a sample of 20,229 observations.
Fraudulent data = fraudulent data relate to cash disbursement and payroll information that was taken from a 1995
King’s County, New York, District Attorney’s Office study (Hill 1998, p.363).

Table A.2. Exact second digit probabilities.
Second Digits (
4
5
0.100 0.097
∑
ExactBenford = theoretical probabilities are computed as
Exact Benford

0
0.120

1
0.114

2
0.109

3
0.104

6
7
8
9
0.093 0.090 0.088 0.085
1 1⁄
where
0,…9.

Table A.3. Exact (Benford) probabilities (p) for the joint occurrence of the first two digits
p
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

0.041392
0.037788
0.034762
0.032184
0.029963
0.028029
0.026329
0.024824
0.023481
0.022277
0.021189
0.020203
0.019305
0.018483
0.017729
0.017033
0.016390
0.015794

p
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

0.015240
0.014723
0.014240
0.013788
0.013364
0.012965
0.012589
0.012234
0.011899
0.011582
0.011281
0.010995
0.010724
0.010465
0.010219
0.009984
0.009760
0.009545

P
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

0.009340
0.009143
0.008955
0.008774
0.008600
0.008433
0.008272
0.008118
0.007969
0.007825
0.007687
0.007553
0.007424
0.007299
0.007178
0.007062
0.006949
0.006839

Exact Benford = theoretical probabilities are computed as
10,…,99.
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p
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
1

0.006733
82
0.006630
83
0.006531
84
0.006434
85
0.006340
86
0.006249
87
0.006160
88
0.006074
89
0.005990
90
0.005909
91
0.005830
92
0.005752
93
0.005677
94
0.005604
95
0.005532
96
0.005463
97
0.005395
98
0.005329
99
1
where

.
p
0.005264
0.005201
0.005140
0.005080
0.005021
0.004963
0.004907
0.004852
0.004799
0.004746
0.004695
0.004645
0.004596
0.004548
0.004500
0.004454
0.004409
0.004365

APPENDIX B

The formulae for the population mean

, variance

, skew ( , and kurtosis

for

the probability distributions in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 in Appendix A are as follows (Kendall
& Stuart, 1977, Eq’s 41, 89, 90):
(B.1)
(B.2)

4
The moments

2

3

12

(B.3)
6

(B.4)

for the probability distributions in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3 are

∑

determined as

3

∑

,

∑

, and

where

1,…,4. Substituting the moments into Eq’s (B.1), (B.2), (B.3), and (B.4) we obtain the
population parameters for the leading digits (the first, second, or first two digits).
,

For example, the first four moments

,

, and

would be 3.44024, 17.89174,

115.08205 and 823.27310, respectively. Given these values, the population mean  1  , variance

  , skew   and kurtosis   would be
1

∑

17.89174

6.05651,

3

2
1

1

3.44024

3 17.89174
4
3 17.89174

3.44014
3

2 3.44024
12

12 17.891743

6

2

/6.05651
⁄

3.44024,

/

115.08205

0.79560 and

823.2731

3.44024

⁄

6 3.44024

4 115.08205
/6.05651

⁄

3.440234
0.54823,

respectively.
Following the same steps as for the first digits, the population mean, variance, skew and
kurtosis for the second digits would be

∑
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4.18739,

8.25381, ,

0.133114, and

1.208390, respectively. Similarly, the population mean, variance, skew
∑

and kurtosis for the first two digits would be
0.771864,

621.8317,

38.5898,

0.546544, respectively.

The population correlation between the first digits and the second digits is determined as
⁄

0.05605574. The

the probabilities given in Table A.3 and computed as
∑

∑

log

1

1
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.

14.801940 and is based on

Payroll
transaction
data

X   x1 , x2 , , x4999, x5000 

Sample 1

Sample 2

 

 

ˆ

1

ˆ

2





Sample 25000



ˆ

25000



Bootstrap
samples of
payroll
expenses
Mean of
payroll
expenses

Sort ˆi from minimum to maximum

ˆ(1) , ˆ (2) ,ˆ (125) , ˆ(126) ,ˆ(24875) , ˆ (24876) ,ˆ (24999) , ˆ (25000)
Construct the 99% confidence interval

ˆ (125) , ˆ(24875) 



Figure 1. Basic bootstrap process for estimating sample statistics and constructing a
confidence interval.
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Start

Select the first two digits, the first digits and the
second digits of the Actual Data (e.g., payroll
transactions).

Execute algorithms to generate Exact
Benford first two digits, first digits and
second digits given the sample size (N) of the
actual data.

Input the first two digits, first digits, and
second digits to the spreadsheet of S+(2008)

Under the command resample using
25,000 samples, compute bootstrap C.I.s based on notations
for the sample statistics [mean(X), var(X), skewness(X), and kurtosis(X)], the Bias-corrected (BCa)
C.I. default option and 99% confidence level.
No
Is the sample size (

1,000 ?

Yes
Conduct First Two Digits Analysis and use the
following Decision Criteria.
No

Yes
Decision Criteria:
Do all (none) of the four C.I.s associated with
the first two digits of the actual data overlap
with Benford C.I.s or contain population
parameters?

Conduct single digit analyses for the
first digits and the second digits:
Do all of the first digits and the second
digits C.I.s of the actual data overlap
with Benford C.I.s or contain population
parameters?
No

Yes

Infer that the actual data
(e.g., payroll transactions)
do not (do) contain
unintentional errors or
fraud.

Infer that the actual
data do not contain
unintentional errors
or fraud.

Does the 99% Bootstrap C.I. for the
Pearson Correlation contain the
)?
population parameter (

Stop
Yes

No

Infer that the actual data (e.g., payroll transactions)
do contain unintentional errors or fraud.

Figure 2. Bootstrap procedure application to digital analysis based on Benford’s Law
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Table 1. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Two Digits of S&P 1500 Companies Earnings (1990 - 2002) a/.
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis

12  38.58976

N  19, 076
N  20, 939

Exact Benford

37.951*  12  39.170

Net Income
(Thousands)
IBEIs***
(Thousands)

37.743  12  38.658**

122  621.83174
608.472*   122  636.277
590.304   122  618.271*

37.555  12  38.419*

588.599   122  614.973*

 12  0.77186

12  0.54654

0.729*   12  0.811

-0.603  12  -0.472*

0.765   12  0.828**

-0.544*  12  -0.404

0.774   12  0.836*

-0.526*  12  -0.392

Table 2. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Two Digits of S&P 1500 Companies Earnings (2003 - 2008) a/.
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis

12  38.58976

N  16, 455
N  18, 391

Exact Benford

38.114*  12  39.113

Net Income
(Thousands)
IBEIs ***
(Thousands)

38.577  12  39.591**

122  621.83174
605.754   122  636.380
610.674   122  640.437**

38.870  12  39.821*

611.999   122  640.115**

 12  0.77186

12  0.54654

0.738*   12  0.807

-0.619*  12  -0.474

0.706   12  0.773**

-0.654  12  -0.517**

0.697   12  0.760*

-0.677  12  -0.548*

Table 3. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Two Digits of S&P 1500 Companies Earnings (1900 - 2008) a/.
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis

12  38.58976

N  35, 531
N  39, 330
*
**
***
a/

Exact Benford

38.211  12  38.907

Net Income
(Thousands)
IBEIs ***
(Thousands)

38.250  12  38.931**

122  621.83174
611.915   122  632.071
604.647   122  624.709**

38.282  12  38.930**

602.968   122  622.665**

 12  0.77186

12  0.54654

0.748   12  0.795

-0.594  12  -0.496

0.748   12  0.794**

-0.578  12  -0.478**

0.745   12  0.788**

-0.577  12  -0.485**

Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data overlap with Benford intervals, and thus retain the corresponding null hypothesis.
Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data contain population parameter, and thus retain the corresponding null hypothesis.
IBEIs=Income before extraordinary items.
Source of data is Compustat.
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Table 4. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Digits of S&P 1500 Companies Earnings (2003-2008) a/.
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis
Exact Benford

N  18, 391

IBEIs ***
(Thousands)

1  3.440237
3.391  1  3.486*
3.472*  1  3.564

 12  6.056513
5.920   12  6.196
5.959   12  6.234**

 1  0.795604
0.765*   1  0.831
0.724   1  0.789*

Table 5. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for Second Digits of S&P 1500 Companies Earnings (2003-2008) a/.
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis
Exact Benford

N  18, 391
*
**
***
a/

IBEIs ***
(Thousands)

2  4.18739
4.131  2  4.240
4.108  2  4.217**

 22  8.25381
8.124   22  8.403
8.119   22  8.396**

 2  0.133114
0.108   2  0.162
0.124   2  0.179**

1  0.548225
-0.619  1  -0.478
-0.678  1  -0.547**

 2  1.208390
-1.230   2  -1.184
-1.235   2  -1.188**

Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data overlap with Benford intervals, and thus retain the corresponding null hypothesis.
Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data contain population parameter, and thus retain the corresponding null hypothesis.
IBEIs=Income before extraordinary items.
Source of data is Compustat.
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Table 6. Nigrini (1996) Distortion Factor Z-Test
Goodness of Fit Test

, Euclidean Distance

for Earnings of S&P 1500 Companies.

Period

Reported Earnings

N

Z

1990 - 2002

Net Income a/

19,076

-2.22949 b/

0.008503 c/

1990 - 2002

Income before
Extraordinary Items
(IBEIs) a/
Net Income a/

20,939

3.61030 b/

0.007760 c/

16,455

2.41083 b/

0.014034 c/

18,391

3.92758 b/

0.018900 c/

35,531

-0.00261

0.009116 c/

39,330

0.04239

0.008579 c/

2003 - 2008
2003 - 2008

1990 - 2008
1990 - 2008

a/
b/
c/
d/

, and Chi-Square

Income before
Extraordinary Items
(IBEIs) a/
Net Income a/
Income before
Extraordinary Items
(IBEIs) a/

19.592 b/ for d1
16.926 b/ for d2
17.367 b/ for d1
27.939 d/ for d2
19.592 b/ for d1
21.958 d/ for d2
38.391 d/ for d1
24.001 d/ for d2
23.001 d/ for d1
28.213 d/ for d2
11.056 b/ for d1
16.140 b/ for d2

Source of data is Compustat.
p-value < 0.05
ED < Empirical Benford (1938) Euclidean Distance ED*=0.024 (Cho and Gaines, 2007).
p-value < 0.01

where
d1 = first digits and d2 = second digits
where
,
is the actual mean of N collapsed numbers scaled to
1 , and
the interval 10,100 and
is the expected mean equal to
90
10 ⁄
0.63825342 √ (Nigrini, 1996).
∑

where

and

are the probabilities associated with a data set and exact Benford

probabilities, respectively.
∑
where Oi and Ei are the observed and expected frequencies for the i-th digit.
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Table 7. The 99% Confidence Intervals for the Pearson Correlation Coefficients.
Population Correlation (

Net Income a/

Income before
Extraordinary Items
(IBEIs) a/

Committee-toCommittee In-Kind
Contribution b/
a/
b/

c/

**

= 0.05605574)

Sample Size

Time Period

Pearson
Correlation
Coefficient

99% Bootstrap Confidence
Intervals (C.I.s) for Pearson
Correlation Coefficient

N  19, 076

1990-2002

0.048 c/

0.028018   d1d 2  0.065154**

2003-2008

0.057

c/

0.037630   d1d 2  0.077312**

c/

0.038199   d1d 2  0.065419**

N  16, 455
N  35, 531

1990-2008

0.052

N  20, 939

1990-2002

0.049 c/

0.032228   d1d 2  0.067095**

2003-2008

0.053

c/

0.033172   d1d 2  0.070844**

0.051

c/

0.038450   d1d 2  0.063920**

N  18, 391
N  39, 330

1990-2008

N  9,878

1998

-0.010

-0.037859   d1d 2  0.014954

2000

0.144

c/

0.118483   d1d 2  0.167231

0.178

c/

0.152893   d1d 2  0.201943

N  10, 759
N  10, 745

2002

Source of data is Compustat.
Data is accessed at the Federal Election Commission website
http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ftpdet.shtml.
p-value < 0.01
Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data contain population parameter, and thus retain
the corresponding null hypothesis.
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Table 8. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Two Digits of All Committee-To-Committee, In-Kind Contributions 1998 b/.
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis

N  9,878

12  38.58976

Exact Benford

37.968  12  39.255

Net Income
(Thousands)

35.528  12  36.686

 122  621.83174
602.032   122  641.456
466.633   122  503.718

 12  0.77186

12  0.54654

0.729   12  0.817

-0.636  12  -0.452

0.880   12  0.969

0.051  12  0.292

Table 9. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Digits of All Committee-To-Committee, In-Kind Contributions 1998 b/.
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis

N  9,878

Exact Benford
Net Income
(Thousands)

1  3.440237
3.373  1  3.500
3.185  1  3.298

 12  6.056513
5.867   12  6.248
4.604   12  4.956

 1  0.795604
0.751   1  0.841
0.861   1  0.948

1  0.548225
-0.636  1  -0.446
-0.103  1  0.123

Table 10. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for Second Digits of All Committee-To-Committee, In-Kind Contributions 1998 b/.
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis

N  9,878

Exact Benford
Net Income
(Thousands)

2  4.18739
4.113  2  4.261
3.635  2  3.789

 22  8.25381
8.072    8.456
2
2

8.653   22  9.057

 2  0.133114
0.095   2  0.170
0.215   2  0.292

 2  1.208390
-1.237   2  -1.174
-1.241   2  -1.168**

Table 11. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Two Digits of All Committee-To-Committee, In-Kind Contributions 2002 b/.
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis

*
**
b/

N  10, 745

12  38.58976

Exact Benford

37.943  12  39.183

Net Income
(Thousands)

38.251  12  39.528**

122  621.83174
603.429   122  640.802
633.833   122  680.387

 12  0.77186

12  0.54654

0.733   12  0.815

-0.634  12  -0.457

0.953   12  1.037

-0.117  12  0.127

Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data overlap with Benford intervals, and thus retain the corresponding null hypothesis.
Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data contain population parameter, and thus retain the corresponding null hypothesis.
Data is accessed at the Federal Election Commission website http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ftpdet.shtml.
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Table 12. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Digits of All Committee-To-Committee, In-Kind Contributions 2002 b/.
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis

N  10, 745

Exact Benford
Net Income
(Thousands)

1  3.440237
3.378  1  3.500
3.401  1  3.528**

 12  6.056513
5.862   12  6.229
6.011   12  6.422**

 1  0.795604
0.753   1  0.840
0.908   1  0.994

1  0.548225
-0.634  1  -0.451
-0.283  1  -0.055

Table 13. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for Second Digits of All Committee-To-Committee, In-Kind Contributions 2002 b/.
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis

N  10, 745

Exact Benford
Net Income
(Thousands)

2  4.18739
4.113  2  4.255
4.126  2  4.276**

 22  8.25381
8.060   22  8.427
8.908   22  9.284

 2  0.133114
0.097   2  0.168
0.017   2  0.090

 2  1.208390
-1.241   2  -1.180
-1.322   2  -1.268

Table 14. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Two Digits of All Committee-To-Committee, In-Kind Contributions 2000 b/.
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis

N  10, 759

12  38.58976

Exact Benford

37.949  12  39.194

Amount

38.258  12  39.543**

122  621.83174
603.981   122  640.660
619.184   122  661.486**

 12  0.77186

12  0.54654

0.733   12  0.817

-0.631  12  -0.451

0.866   12  0.951

-0.324  12  -0.107

Table 15. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Digits of All Committee-To-Committee, In-Kind Contributions 2000 b/.
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis
Exact Benford
1  3.440237
 1  0.795604
1  0.548225
 2  6.056513
1

*
**
b/

Benford

3.377  1  3.500*

5.880   12  6.243

0.751   1  0.836

-0.642  1  -0.459

Amount

3.441*  1  3.563

5.894   12  6.283**

0.826   1  0.909

-0.433  1  -0.232

Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data overlap with Benford intervals, and thus retain the corresponding null hypothesis.
Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data contain population parameter, and thus retain the corresponding null hypothesis.
Data is accessed at the Federal Election Commission website http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ftpdet.shtml.
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Table 16. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for Second Digits of All Committee-To-Committee, In-Kind Contributions 2000 b/.
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis

N  10, 759

Exact Benford
Amount

2  4.18739
4.115  2  4.260
3.911  2  4.067

 22  8.25381
8.081   22  8.447
9.550   22  9.953

 2  0.133114
0.097   2  0.168
0.132   2  0.206**

Table 17. The 99% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for First Digits of an Extreme Fraud Data c/.
Population Parameters for the Mean, Variance, Skew, and Kurtosis

N  20, 229

Exact Benford
Extreme Fraud Data

N  500
Exact Benford
Extreme Fraud Data
*
**
b/

c/

 2  1.208390
-1.238   2  -1.177
-1.343   2  -1.284

1  3.440237
3.400  1  3.491
5.171  1  5.203

 12  6.056513
5.925   12  6.193
0.735   12  0.803

 1  0.795604
0.767   1  0.828
-0.0382   1  0.200

1  0.548225
-0.612  1  -0.477
3.910  1  4.275

1  3.440237
3.142  1  3.714
5.084  1  5.286

 12  6.056513
5.265   12  6.953

 1  0.795604
0.602   1  0.996
-0.693   1  0.897

1  0.548225
-0.920  1  -0.078
3.067  1  5.491

0.570   12  1.004

Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data overlap with Benford intervals, and thus retain the corresponding null hypothesis.
Bold numbers mean bootstrap intervals of the actual data contain population parameter, and thus retain the corresponding null hypothesis.
Data is accessed at the Federal Election Commission website http://www.fec.gov/finance/disclosure/ftpdet.shtml.
First digits are generated in MINITAB based on the fraud data provided by Hill (1998, p. 363)

The opinions of the authors are not necessarily those of Louisiana State University, the E.J. Ourso College of business, the LSU Accounting Department,
Roosevelt University, the Senior Editor, or the Editor.
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